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The Dialectics of Fashion 
Gender and Politics in Yemen 
Sheila Carapico 
The situation of Yemeni women is complicated and contradic-
tory. On the one hand, compared with relatively fashion-
forward Mediterranean Arabs, or even their affluent sisters 
in the Gulf, Yemeni women appear to be especially old-
fashioned. One rarely sees a Yemeni woman outdoors bare-
headed, and in the capital, Sana'a, most women cover their 
faces in public. Yet outward appearances can be misleading. 
While it is tempting to assume that women "still" veil because 
"tradition" tells them to, it is simply wrong to conclude that 
"traditionally" all women were secluded in their homes, or 
that how they dress now tells us much about their political and 
economic status. Clothes do not make the woman: lives are 
shaped by political currents and economic realities. 
The public roles and civil rights of Yemeni women have 
been conditioned by the vicissitudes of national politics, with 
important differences between North and South.' Even in the 
more conservative North, by the 1970s permissive legislation 
afforded rights of pregnancy leave, voting, driving, travel, 
property ownership, and public office, and several women 
gained real national prominence as television broadcasters. 
Yet only the brightest daughters of educated parents could 
read. Through the 1980s, the overwhelming majority of urban 
females left school after a couple of years to become home-
makers. Their country cousins, busy from dawn to dusk tend-
ing dairy cows, drawing water, collecting fuel and fodder, 
harvesting crops, and processing food, found respite only in 
the customary forty-day rest after childbirth or in old age. 2 
Women's economic participation in the agrarian economy was 
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substantial, and intensified due to massive male migration; but their par-
ticipation in the modem sector was minuscule.3 
After its 1962 republican revolution, North Yemen witnessed the popu-
larization of veiling as the emerging bourgeoisie imitated the prim-and-
proper "ladies" of the old gentry of the sayyid strata, symbolized by a par-
ticular style of full formal black veil called the sharshaf Customarily, women 
dressed for the climate and for work, with wraps serving as pockets, sun-
screen, and dust protection. In the steamy Tihama coast along the Red Sea, 
where Arabia meets Africa, women wore bright skirts and skimpy halter-
tops, layered with a sheer, breezy caftan for going out; in the southern up-
lands, full, filmy shifts with a bright scarf loosely wrapped about the head, 
perhaps with a silk abayia for the city. In the cooler Zaydi highlands women 
wore wide sinval pants beneath a fitted caftan, with a long scarf tied tightly in 
such a way that a lithma could be lowered beneath the chin or raised over the 
nose and mouth, all covered by the item Americans call an India-print bed-
spread. (Shafa'i males typically wear a futah or sarong, whereas Zaydis 
prefer a white thawb, both with a sports jacket; most men cover their heads 
and, like the movie images of American cowboys, sometimes their faces.) 
The sharshaf, which rather resembles a nun's habit, traditionally signified 
elite women dressed up for afternoon tea. As society changed, however, 
many women thought in terms of the liberty to sharshaf, because wearing the 
veil symbolized relief from hard labor, dignity in the marketplace, freedom to 
study, and equality with the old elite. As they moved to the cities, or as their 
own communities urbanized, as they were exposed to an opulent Saudi style 
ofhypermodesty, and as they entered school, the new generation of Northern 
girls adopted the sharshaf, even in Tihami cities where the heat makes them 
insufferable. Folk dresses became associated with old age and ignorance. 
In South Yemen, by contrast, or at least in the formerly British colonial 
port city of Aden, where revolutionaries established the Arab world's only 
Marxist regime (the People's Democratic Republic or PDRY), women en-
joyed rights unrivaled in the region. Females represented roughly a third of 
all Adeni students, teachers, medical personnel, civil servants, and factory 
workers and a visible minority among lawyers, judges, directors, administra-
tors, middle-level party cadre, and parliamentarians. Courts granted mothers 
custody of children and the marital home in event of divorce.4 As in the 
Northern hinterland, however, provincial dress and behavior varied consid-
erably by region: for instance, the tribeswomen of the Mahra mountains 
were far more assertive and active than the demure housebound sayyidat of 
Hadrami towns. 
DIALECTICS OF FASHION: GENDER AND POLITICS IN YEMEN 185 
Under the unity arrangements in effect between 1990 and 1994, South-
ern women, especially Adenis who moved to Sana'a, felt their freedoms 
slipping away. For instance, some husbands obtained "quickie" divorces or 
second-marriage licenses. Northern women, by contrast, experienced new-
found political power. Ten female PDRY parliamentary delegates continued 
to serve in the first unity parliament. Over protests from some conservative 
jurists, a woman was appointed, albeit temporarily, to the fifteen-member 
Supreme Court. Others served in Aden courts. One woman was named to the 
seventeen-person Supreme Elections Committee. Fifty women, mostly inde-
pendent urban intellectuals, ran amidst over 3,000 males in the 1993 parlia-
mentary elections. Only two won seats in 1993, both in Southern constituen-
cies, and some women candidates, like some male counterparts, experienced 
personal harassment during the campaign. Nonetheless widespread accep-
tance of universal adult suffrage was demonstrated by the fact that the neo-
conservative Isiah party, standard-bearer for the religious right, conducted a 
special female voter-registration drive. Other women were named deputy 
minister of information, dean of education, and directors of various agencies. 
A survey found about two thousand professionally qualified women in edu-
cation, health, communications, law, business, and other fields. · 
Unity brought some compromises in urban fashion. Adenis who came to 
Sana'a, whether in 1986 or 1990, almost inevitably donned a scarf and either 
an abayia or a European raincoat. It became fashionable for Sana'ani students 
to wear what they call hijab, a headscarf wrapped or tied under the chin with a 
modem long black silk coatdress over jeans, Paris fashions, or knock-offs. 
The appearance in cities of Egyptian-style "coiffure" shops reflected a trend 
toward hairstyling instead of wearing bright scarves for women's parties or 
evenings at home. The increasing politicization of sartorial issues was ampli-
fied by the stridence of emphatically sharshafed activists within the neo-
Islamist movement, some of them effective public orators from beneath a full 
black face-veil. They contend that Muslim women and girls have rights to 
separate education, to financial support and legal mediation from male rela-
tives, and to insert stipulat10ns in the marriage contract. 
Beneath their shabby polyester sharshafs, ordinary women worried 
about economics, not fashion. In the deep recession precipitated by the return 
of Yemeni migrants from Saudi Arabia and the loss of the bulk of its foreign 
aid due to the Gulf War, exacerbated by low oil prices and bad public man-
agement, the growing urban underclass and the increasingly impoverished 
rural majority's standards of living have declined. Among the burgeoning 
urban population, most women were uprooted from productive roles in their 
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natal communities to nuclear households entirely dependent on spousal earn-
ing capacity and spending decisions. Alienated from both their families and 
the means of production, they are typically at the mercy of a matched-mate 
who is himself powerless except within the domestic domain. Their sisters 
and cousins who remain in farming villages bear the increased burden of 
maintaining cottage gardens, domestic livestock, and aging parents, all the 
more so if they send their daughters to school. 
The majority of women neither vote nor want to talk politics, which they 
regard with justifiable skepticism as a violent male domain. Their conversa-
tion dwells on marriage, childbirth, and, increasingly, the loss of earnings, 
joblessness, high inflation, overburdened underfinanced social services, and 
diminishing returns from traditional agriculture and crafts. By the time par-
liamentary elections were held in April 1993, the most pressing issue among 
Southerners was the price of milk, which had quadrupled since unity. A year 
later, Sana'ani families who had always purchased bulk quantities of grain 
wholesale were reduced to purchasing flour by the kilo from the comer re-
tailer. Meat, once a luncheon staple, was now reserved for special holidays.5 
By 1994, the fiscal crisis of the state only exacerbated political competi-
tion between the military faction that had governed the former North Yemen 
and the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) that had ruled the PDRY. Eventually, 
the bipolar partisan competition erupted into a civil war wherein the former 
Northern army defeated what remained of PDRY forces. Socialist leaders 
went into exile. Although civilian casualties were relatively light, thousands 
of families were displaced to temporary shelters, and hundreds of thousands 
were terrorized by the sounds and sights of bombs, missiles, and gunfire, and 
by the suspension of electricity, water, and normal life. Women wept, and 
nowhere more bitterly than in Aden, site of so many episodes of urban 
warfare in the past generation. 
The defeat of the separatist leadership of the Yemeni Socialist Party may 
have delighted freemarketeers, but it was bad news for advocates of female 
rights in Yemen, for a rightist coalition comprised of the military and neo-
conservatives triumphed. In the aftermath of the war progressive male jour-
nalists, professors, and party leaders were mugged or abducted by plain-
clothes security officers; newspapers were shut down or given new editors; 
socialist establishments, "coiffures," and even some southern saints' tombs 
were vandalized; and the constitution was amended to retract many of the 
rights and liberties granted after unification. One amendment specified that 
"women are the sisters of men," and new personal status and criminal stat-
utes reduced women to legal wards of male kin. Although women were still 
DIALECTICS OF FASHION: GENDER AND POLITICS IN YEMEN 187 
guaranteed electoral suffrage and a token judicial and ministerial role, wives 
required their husbands' permission to work, to travel abroad, or to divorce, 
and in court a woman's testimony counted only half as much as a man's. 
The Islamist dimension of these developments is distinctively modem 
and untraditional. Neofundamentalist ideologues identify themselves as 
Wahhabi or salafi (puritan), and they explicitly eschew popular Yemeni prac-
tices of Zaydi Islam in the northern highlands and the majority Shafa'i Sunni 
sect in the rest of the country. This is why salafis attacked Shafa'i mosques 
and shrines after the civil war and Wahhabis fought for control of Zaydi 
parochial schools. The neo-Islamists within and beyond Isiah condemn many 
customs including sayyid privileges, traditional wedding celebrations, popu-
lar forms of feminine adornment, and the curricula of prerevolutionary 
Qur'anic institutes. Their campaigns for feminine seclusion are one aspect of 
a broader, radical agenda that draws more inspiration from the schools of 
Islamic learning established in Pakistan to support the Afghan jihad than 
from Yemeni religious scholarship, practice, or belief. Within Yemen, this 
extremist group is known as "Afghan Arabs." One example of their absurd 
pronouncements (laughable to most Yemenis) is that it is haram (sinful) for 
females to milk cows because of the purportedly vulgar hand movement. 
The plight of women and their families in the late 1990s was not unlike 
that of popular classes in many Latin American countries in a period of 
military-market fascism in the '70s and early '80s; there extrajudicial vio-
lence against men and threat of sexual censure against women were part of an 
apparatus of control in a system where officers helped themselves to both 
public and private sectors amidst inflation and economic reform imposed by 
foreign creditors. Privatization of the assets of a socialist state and of social 
services, including hospitals, utilities, and higher education, enriches the 
private holdings of a military class while impoverishing the masses drawn to 
the city by the false lure of civil service sinecures. Currency devaluation, 
investor incentives, and open markets satisfy foreign creditors that "re-
forms" are underway, and declining standards of living for the majority of the 
population are regarded as the necessary medicine. In Yemen, as elsewhere in 
the Arab world, the encouragement of neo-Islamic groups was one element 
of a decades long struggle by military leaders against all forms of socialism, 
communism, and left liberalism. The seemingly final repudiation of social-
ism in Yemen has been accompanied by a wave of radical neofundamental-
ism, albeit less violent than in Algeria, Afghanistan, the Occupied Territories, 
or Egypt. In the peninsula generally, neofundamentalist Islam - whether 
Wahhabi, Shi' a, salafi, or another version - is now the main challenge to 
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authoritarian states. Yemen is exceptional in that social conditions are much 
worse than elsewhere in the Arabian peninsula. 
Nonviolent Islamist messages have considerable appeal among women. 
A physician from Aden recalled having partied in public on New Year's eve 
of 1986, which turned out to be the eve of a vicious bloodletting among the 
YSP elite. Concluding that "our lord was displeased," she said, university 
women began wearing hijab. As already noted, the Yemeni conservative 
party, Isiah, conducted female voter registration and participation drives in 
both the 1993 and 1997 parliamentary elections. In the current environment 
of economic austerity, newly founded Islamic charities have offered a social 
safety net specifically designed to catch girls and young brides. To the typical 
Yemeni woman voter, who is a devoted mother, semiliterate, informally 
employed, overworked, highly vulnerable, and politically alienated, the 
Qur'an readings and paternalistic protections offered by some of the father 
figures in Isiah (as distinct from the youthful militant "Afghan Arabs") have 
a certain appeal. Many seek solace and an "escape from freedom" in prayer, 
piety, and obedience. Moreover, the harassment of young men who hang out 
on the streets, typically unemployed migrant-returnees, who are more often 
rude than religious, has gotten so troublesome that many African and West-
ern women wear the hijab, too. 
Most women are more vulnerable than they have ever been. Whereas in 
the past bride-price provided some insurance of a wife's longterm material 
and physical wellbeing, nowadays more parents are tempted to "sell" their 
daughters to old men or military officers. Young brides who fall in love with 
their grooms may quickly squander their wedding gifts on day-to-day marital 
household expenses.6 Health care personnel observe the greater frequency of 
still undocumented cases of spousal abuse among women too far from their 
parents to run home, although doctors realize that only the most egregious 
gunshot and knife wounds reach the hospital. Women who have never had 
their eyesight checked or their tooth-cavities filled are unlikely to practice 
gynecological birth control, but hospitalization for emergencies and wide-
spread immunization against early childhood diseases have boosted live 
births while reducing infant mortality. The result by 1996 was the world's 
highest rate of natural population growth, 3.7 percent. Whereas when their 
mothers married they typically moved from one extended family to another 
nearby to raise five or six children among twenty cousins, sharing farm and 
nursery duties with mothers- and sisters-in-law, the typical woman of this 
generation is blessed with eight or nine children by her thirtieth birthday and 
struggles to raise them alone on whatever money her husband brings home. 
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Whereas her mother and grandmother were productive in agriculture, hus-
bandry, and crafts, the modem Yemeni woman is a housewife, specialized in 
reproduction and struggling against rapid inflation in the costs of utilities, 
grain, and rent that leave precious little for meat, transport, medical care, or 
vocational training. 
The combined pressures of antisocialist policies specifically including 
repudiation of women's rights, of economic austerity and recession, and of 
violence against critics of the regime certainly augur ill for women generally. 
And yet Yemeni women do indeed enjoy political rights and ordinary per·-
sonal liberties denied to their more affluent sisters in the Gulf, none of whom 
are allowed to vote, and many of whom face much stricter legal restrictions 
on their public comportment or employment. The female franchise was re-
affirmed in Yemen's 1997 parliamentary elections, when women accounted 
for a quarter of the electorate. Twenty-three women ran for election, but more 
of them were party candidates. Whereas in 1993 only two parties, the So-
cialists and the Ba'th, ran women candidates, now seven out of the eight 
parties - the exception being the Isiah - ran women for parliament. Again 
two women entered parliament, again both from the South, but this time 
backed by Sana'a. While about a dozen female judges remained on the bench 
in southern courts, several female law graduates became practicing attorneys. 
Others were promoted to the rank (although not the position) of minister. A 
move toward gender-segregated colleges notwithstanding, women compete 
with men in most faculties. 
For the several dozen women prominent in public life, then, success de-
pends more on one's relationship to the national leadership than on gender as 
such. Women in powerful families enjoy the privileges, if not the direct politi-
cal prowess, of the ruling class. For others politically active "in their own 
right," the possibilities are not necessarily less than civilian male counter-
parts of comparable family, education, wealth, and age. The current litmus 
test of "support for unity" is the same for both genders. Conversely, however, 
some are doubly victimized, by gender and by politics. Southern women 
suffer special indignities from northern soldiers whose indoctrination in-
cludes anticommunist propaganda about sexual promiscuity under the PDRY. 
Western and northern Arab feminist advocacy through assistance pro-
grams for women operates obliquely in this environment. Mother and child 
health programs, for instance, offer essential medical services on a "cost-
recovery" basis that may make them more expensive than comparable pro-
grams offered through Yemeni religious charities. Funds and training for 
microenterprises encourage marginally remunerative housewifery skills like 
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needlecraft and food production, again no different from the neo-Islamist 
programs for girls, and short of traditional productive contributions. The 
availability of international funds for projects involving women in the elec-
toral process is an inducement for Yemenis to found women's associations 
and for the government to guarantee a female voice inside parliament, but the 
lion's share of foreign money for these initiatives goes to a handful of 
English-speaking politicians. Western support for privatization, marketiza-
tion, and other "post-socialist" reforms unwittingly fortifies those who asso-
ciate gender equity with communism. American concern for the stability of 
the misogynist Saudi monarchy (not to mention their joint backing for the 
Afghan jihad) is at odds with statements and efforts on behalf of electoral 
participation by Yemeni women, for Riyadh contends that voting generally, 
female suffrage, is anti-Islamic, and spends good money broadcasting this 
message. Finally, the European, North American, or Mediterranean Arab 
visitors who address women's liberation in Yemen from a fashion perspec-
tive, as if there were a "right" to Western-style clothes, are puzzled by local 
women's responses. More than any of these things, Yemeni women are con-
cerned about welfare and violence. 
Some rather dire circumstances notwithstanding, South Arabian wom-
anhood is not entirely helpless. Folk historiography reveres Queen Bilqis of 
Sheba (Saba') and the medieval Queen Arwa as its best-loved, wisest leaders. 
The courts do offer some legal protections under contract and property law.7 
The PDRY legacy cannot be wholly obliterated. The unified republic is 
committed to feminine electoral rights. Yemeni males are far more victim to 
physical violence and political repression than females, and their political 
and civil rights are also insecure. Given a certain brutality in the public 
political sphere and the economy, "withdrawal" - veiling, political aliena-
tion, dropping out of school, consenting to polygamous marriage, socializing 
only with women - may represent deliberate choices. Yet more and more 
females, especially but not exclusively those from families with wealth, 
power, and prestige, are finishing secondary school, graduating from the 
universities, pursuing careers, joining parties and civic associations, and 
entering the public sphere. Equally important the men who head all three 
main political tendencies - the Socialists, the Islamists, and the governing 
party-recognize the political advantages of empowering women politi-
cally: to distinguish Yemen as more progressive and republican than the 
neighboring monarchies, and to cultivate a voting constituency among the 
unarmed half of the population. Given its political and economic difficulties, 
Yemen would do well to do well by its women. 
